Introduction
Revolutionary changes in international relations and communication technologies have inspired state and non-state actors to initiate public diplomacy (PD) programs or to examine and adjust existing ones. 1 States face diff erent challenges and have diff erent needs. Th e big powers like the US, China and Russia receive substantial attention due to their standing and infl uence in the world. Th e middle powers like Australia, Canada and Norway are searching for a mission or a niche that would best serve their political and economic interests in the world. Small states, especially developing countries, seek attention and acknowledgement that they exist and have something to contribute. States and non-state actors engaged in war and confl ict like Israel and the Palestinians, wish to gain support for their respective causes in international organizations and world public opinion.
States have been aware of the need to develop and adjust their PD programs to the challenges and opportunities of the information age. Th ey have invested considerable resources in evaluation and creation of new initiatives. States that failed to cope with the challenges of the information age denied themselves a critical instrument of diplomacy and foreign policy. From both theoretical and practical perspectives it is vital to investigate how diff erent actors have approached the need to evaluate and reform PD. A comparative analysis may yield a list of strategies which actors may adopt and modify according to their specifi c needs. A comparative analysis of reform strategies may also contribute observations and fi ndings to the slowly emerging fi eld of comparative PD.
on-line and many participated in town meetings and conferences. Th e results were presented to the public in a special report. 7 A parliamentary committee in Australia initiated a major study of PD and made many interesting and useful recommendations.
8 Th e committee opened up the process, invited heads and leaders of relevant organizations to submit papers, and held hearings.
Th ese few cases may suggest that sates select approaches to reform based on their respective PD systems. Th ose of Norway and Poland were centralized and selective while those of Canada and Australia were more fragmented and inclusive, and both the processes of reforms and the conduct of PD may refl ect the diff erent societal composition of the states: more homogenic in the fi rst two and more multicultural in the last two.
Th is chapter examines how Israel has attempted to reform its PD. More than any country, Israel needed a major overhaul of its PD. 9 In the last twenty years the Jewish state has faced enormous foreign policy and national security challenges.
10 Th e main threats evolved from a protracted low intensity confl ict with the Palestinians and Iran's proxies in the Middle East: Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Several dramatic events exposed serious weaknesses in Israeli PD including the fi rst Palestinian Intifada (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) , the failure of the Oslo peace process (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) , the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon (2000) , the Second Palestinian Intifada (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , the infamous UN World Conference Against Racism held in Durban (2001), the Israeli unilateral disengagement from Gaza (2005) and the Second Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah (2006) . All these events demonstrated that Israel was paying heavy political and diplomatic costs for the failure to eff ectively employ PD.
Successive Israeli governments have been aware of the need to rebuild Israel's PD. Leaders have called for major reforms but the awareness and the vigorous statements have never been translated into 0001215915 . INDD 35 0001215915 . INDD 35 9/24/2010 1:09:07 PM 9/24/2010 1:09:07 PM actions. Substantial public support and engagement in PD is required for successful expansion and utilization of PD. Th e Israeli public has strongly supported reforms in the PD system. Th e media oft en complained about the lack of eff ective PD, the public has been aware of this defi ciency and several bodies such as the State Comptroller and the Keenest Committee on Defense and Foreign Aff airs issued critical reports documenting the abysmal results and demanding major reforms. Yet, the government has never made a serious attempt to build an eff ective PD system and has never consulted the people and local civil society organs in the formulation and implementation of PD. Th is chapter systematically examines Israeli attempts to change and adjust its PD to the challenges of both the information revolution and the low intensify confl ict with the Palestinians and other regional enemies. It fi rst maps governmental and extra-governmental agencies and organizations pursuing PD on behalf of Israel. It then examines various plans and actions to reform and rebuild the system. Th e fi ndings reveal a highly fragmented and defi cient system, and reforms attempts which failed due to bureaucratic and personal interests of politicians and offi cials. Th e last section presents an optimal model for Israel that with some modifi cations may be suitable for other countries, particularly those facing similar challenges and threats.
Governmental Public Diplomacy
Many organizations in Israel pursue public diplomacy, directly or indirectly, but the system has been fragmented and there has never been one authority for direction and coordination (see Figure 1) . Th e military establishment, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have dominated Israel's defense and foreign aff airs, and as the owners and practitioners of hard power have not appreciated the value of soft power and PD.
Th e Prime Minister Offi ce's (PMO) is responsible for policy planning, formulation and implementation and has several bodies to accomplish these tasks. Th e most relevant offi ces for PD are those of the Spokesperson and the Foreign Communication Adviser, the Government Press Offi ce (GPO), which provides services to foreign reporters stationed in Israel, and the National Security Council (NSC); however, the PMO is also responsible for the intelligence services including the domestic General Security Agency (GSA) and the Mossad, the institute for intelligence and special operations abroad.
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In times of low intensity confl ict, these organizations may provide useful information for PD or will be engaged in activity that bears directly on PD. GSA may provide information on terrorist activity and leaders of terrorist organizations which could justify a military operation against them, and the Mossad may be implicated in illegal or problematic activities abroad, as it did in recent years in Jordan, New Zealand and Switzerland. In general, given the fragile structure of Israeli coalition governments, the PMO's media and communication offi cials are mostly concerned with the Prime Minister's political interests. Occasionally, they respond to crises or create opportunities for PD during offi cial state visits abroad. Th e GPO's duties have been mostly confi ned to technical matters and has never been given a prominent role in the formulation and implementation of PD. Th e establishment in 1970 of a unit for communication with foreign reporters at the Foreign Ministry also eroded the GPO's standing in the PD system. Th e NSC was established in 1999 in order to improve the quality of policymaking and coordination among the diff erent governmental units responsible for defense and foreign aff airs. Th is body could have served as an excellent organ for planning and coordination of PD. From the outset however, it became clear that the NSC could nott accomplish its goals. Th e MOD and IDF, wanting to preserve their domination of the policymaking process, strongly opposed the Council and undermined its work.
Prime Minister Office
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Th e Ministry of Foreign Aff airs (MFA) could have been the natural centre for the development and practice of PD. Headed by Deputy Director Generals, several divisions and departments are employing a variety of PD instruments. 13 Information and Media is the principal division. It covers public aff airs (publications, productions, and special projects), press relations, information and the Internet, and external relations (friendship societies, local government, and other links). Th e division however, is understaff ed and has a very limited budget for PD activities, about $10 million per year. Th e other relevant divisions include Cultural and Scientifi c Aff airs, International Cooperation (foreign aid), International Organizations and the UN, Diaspora and World Jewish Aff airs, and Religious Aff airs.
Although Israeli culture, literature, music, fi lm, theatre, dance and plastic arts are highly popular around the world, the cultural division budget is extremely limited, and aft er recent budgetary cuts, MFA was forced the reduce the number of cultural attachés from 14 to 4.
14 Until the UN Durban Conference, the MFA ignored NGOs and concentrated on the UN and international organizations where Israel increasingly has faced hostile debates and one-sided severe condemnation and criticism. Since the Durban conference, however, the Division of International Organizations and the UN is devoting more attention and is allocating more resources to NGOs.
Th e Center for International Cooperation (Mashav) was established in 1958 and has trained over 250.000 students from the developing world, primarily from Africa. 15 Training and projects were designed to harness Israel's innovations and experience in agriculture, health, education, and science for helping developing countries to become more productive and meet their essential economic and social needs. Israeli aid to developing countries was more attractive than aid from big powers because the Jewish state was free of colonial past and imperial ambitions, and was viewed as less threatening to the sovereignty and independence of the recipient states. 16 Israel's long-term aid to Africa may have contributed to the relative favourable Israeli reputation in states such as the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Ghana. promotion and technological and industrial cooperation, while the IDF sends military attachés to Israeli embassies abroad.
Th e IDF Spokesperson Division is the largest spokesperson unit in Israel with more than 400 offi cers, civilians and soldiers and with a reserve unit of almost 1,200 soldiers and offi cers. Its mission is to report on IDF's accomplishments and activities to the Israeli and international public, to nurture public confi dence in the IDF, and to serve as the IDF's primary professional authority on matters of public relations and distribution of information to the public. Th e IDF Spokesperson's Division performs a variety of functions, serving as the spokesperson for the IDF both at home and abroad, developing and implementing public relations (PR) policies, disseminating military related information to the public, instructing IDF personnel in matters pertaining to PR, and developing relationships with media outlets and accompanying them to military events. Th e Home Front Command and the Public Security Ministry, which includes the Police spokesperson unit, are relevant to PD because of the Palestinian and the Hezbollah attacks on Israeli civilians residing in towns and villages. In low-intensity confl ict the boundaries between the home front and the military front are blurred. Th e Command instructs the public how to cope with conventional and non-conventional threats. Police routinely attempts to foil terrorist attacks, restore order when they happen and investigate who are the terrorists, how they carry out the attacks and who send them. Police is also relevant to PD because it routinely deals with sensitive PD issues including immigration, foreign labor and international crime. 22 Th e term extra-governmental is used here because it is broader than the term NGOs which is now closely associated with organizations interested in global issues such as human rights, environmental protection, religion, and health.
Th e extra-governmental network is also highly fragmented. 22 It includes organizations and groups that may be classifi ed into fi ve basic clusters: advocacy and lobbying, media relations, Diaspora PD, academic aff airs and specifi c areas (see Figure 2) . Figure 2 shows that among the extra-governmental organizations, media relations attract attention and resources more than any other PD instrument. It also shows that much of the activity focuses on the US, where the standing of Israel among both the public and policy makers is highly positive. Th e contributions of all these many diverse organizations have never been assessed in any systematic way. AIPAC, for example, has been recently criticized by American politicians, officials and scholars who among other things blamed the advocacy organization and Israel for pushing the US to wage the war in Iraq. Most of the claims made by the critics have been discredited but the overall eff ects of the controversy on public opinion and policy aren't yet known. 28 Similarly, the eff ects of media monitoring are also not clear.
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Rivalries and Reform Attempts
Successive Israeli Governments recognized the need to reform the PD system. Th ey conducted studies, established committees, held conferences and produced many reports. Most proposals however, were ignored and the few that were implemented didn't last long. Th e various proposals included the appointment of a minister or a deputy minister for information in the PM offi ce, establishment of bodies such as a national information division at the PM Offi ce, an intergovernmental coordinating body under the chairmanship of the Director General of the PM Offi ce or a ministerial committee for information.
Th e drive for reforms stemmed from widespread feelings that Israel's PD is not working because of fragmentation and bureaucratic and personal fi ghting over authority, policy, information sharing and resources. Several ministries, primarily the PM Offi ce, Foreign Aff airs and Defense, have oft en clashed over foreign policy and PD strategies. Clashes have occurred both at the highest ministerial levels as well as at lower levels, over structural and policy issues as well as on specifi c or relatively insignifi cant problems. Clashes have occurred inside ministries, among ministries, and between governmental agencies and extra-governmental organizations.
A few examples from the Second Intifada well illustrate the rivalries and their disastrous eff ects both on the conduct of PD and the attempts to reform the system. Th e Foreign Ministry oft en complained that MOD and the IDF did not provide or share critical information on military activity that has direct bearing on Israel's reputation and standing in the world. Th e same Ministry, however, completely ignored the GPO when, at the beginning of the intifada, it opened a communication center for foreign journalists. At the same time, PM Ehud Barak instructed his offi ce to prepare and disseminate a "white paper" on the involvement of Arafat and the Palestinian Authority in terrorism. Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami opposed the strategy and refused to disseminate the book, claiming that Arafat was still a partner for negotiations. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister distributed the book to foreign visitors and organizations abroad, creating confusion at home and abroad about Israel's policy. Aft er Operation "Defensive Shield" in Jenin, Barak's successor, Ariel Sharon, rejected a UN proposal to send an investigative committee, but Foreign Minister Shimon Peres endorsed it. 30 With Israel speaking in two opposite voices, it was unclear what policy was and who was making it.
Several PMs attempted to reform the PD system but could not make any signifi cant progress. Barak, for example, wanted to build a national information and communication division in his offi ce, and in October 2000 he appointed Nachman Shai to "guide" and "coordinate" all Israeli communication and information activities. Th ese functions were written into the appointment letter but were not suffi ciently clear. Shai was also hindered by internal strife inside the Prime Minister's offi ce between the Bureau Chief and the Chief of Staff and Security Adviser and by the reluctance of the diff erent government agencies responsible for communication and PD to cooperate with him.
In August 2001, PM Sharon attempted to repair Israeli PD via the appointment of a minister dedicated the function. He asked Tzipi Livni, a minister without portfolio, to plan and coordinate PD strategies and programs. Livni concluded that eff ective guidance and coordination of PD requires the establishment of a central authority at the PM Offi ce. She had no chance to implement her proposal, however, because Foreign Minister Peres and his senior staff did not want to lose their PD monopoly and undermined her initiatives. As Sharon did not want to confront Peres on this issue, Livni had no other choice but to resign from her PD assignment. Sharon then attempted to fi ll the position of Communication and Information Head in his offi ce but the offi cial appointed, Yossi Gal, a veteran diplomat from the Foreign Ministry, survived only two months. Tensions also occurred between the government and extra-governmental organizations. For example, aft er Operation Defensive Shield, the Israel Project conducted a major advertising campaign against Palestinian terrorism. Th e Foreign Ministry criticized this campaign as hysterical, believing it damaged Israeli economic and tourism interests.
Rivalries and reform attempts also occurred at lower levels of the national security and foreign policy establishment. Th e IDF became aware of the need to address PD and communication challenges, but units and offi cers pursued personal initiatives. For example, at the beginning of the Second Intifada, the Central Command (responsible for the West Bank) established a Center for Documentation and Communication, contending that IDF spokespersons were incapable of providing eff ective communication responses. Th e Center, however, was isolated from both the IDF Spokesperson unit and the Foreign Ministry. When a Palestinian boy, Mohammed al-Dora, died at the beginning of the Intifada in a war zone in Gaza, the IDF spoke in two voices. Th e General Staff hurriedly accepted responsibility for the death of al-Dora, while the Southern Command did not and vehemently denied media reports suggesting that Israeli soldiers deliberately killed the boy.
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More successful but limited reforms occurred at lower levels of the bureaucracy. For example, both the MFA and the IDF recognized the need to deal more eff ectively with the Arab media. Th e communication revolution in the Arab world, primarily the emerging of numerous regional and global Arab satellite television networks such as Al-Jazeera, required adjustments in the existing administrative structures. Hence, the Information and Media Division at the Foreign Ministry established a special unit for the Arab media, fi rst within the Press Department and later as a separate independent department. In meet the growing needs for sustained and well organized relations with the Arab media.
Attempts have also been made to reform specifi c PD instruments. Th e Brand Israel Group, a coalition of seven marketing and communications executives, has concluded that due to Israel's poor reputation abroad and PD failures, it needs a re-branding campaign. Th e work began when the advertising fi rm Young & Rubicam included Israel in its quarterly review of 13,000 brands. Th e survey found that Israel is well known but has little relevance for younger Americans, who only associate it with war.
32 Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who had been exposed to weaknesses in Israel's PD when she served as a minister at the PM Offi ce, strongly supported the initiative. In 2005, the PM Offi ce, the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Finance decided to authorize the Foreign Ministry to direct the branding project and allocated about $2.5 million for that purpose.
Th e Centralized Model: A PD Authority
Th e optimal model for Israeli PD must be centralized and suffi ciently fl exible to meet the needs of both peace and war. Offi cials and experts have suggested diff erent administrative ways to accomplish this task. Oft en, however, these proposals refl ected bureaucratic or personal interests. Foreign Ministry offi cials, for example, have always advocated a system with the Foreign Ministry at the center. One Prime Ministerial Bureau Chief suggested a new PD body and placed himself at the helm to increase his personal power at the PM Offi ce. If the Foreign Ministry is a natural place to plan, coordinate and supervise PD, and although the National Security Council could also fulfi l this function, the traditional weakness of these two bodies and their limited role in the making of Israel's foreign and defense policy means that the solution can only come with the establishment of new powerful PD authority at the Prime Minister's Offi ce.
In 2001 and 2002, the Israeli State Comptroller examined the Hasbara (PD) system, including activities of the PMO, MFA, MOD and IDF, the Ministry for Public Security and Police, and as the intelligence services. 33 Th e results were extremely critical. Th e report concluded that although the government recognized PD as one of the most important tools in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, particularly during the Intifada, the system failed to prepare for and to deal with Arab and Palestinian information campaigns. Th e report attributed failure to the following factors: a lack of a "supreme head" and coordinator for the national PD eff ort; a lack of coordination among the ministries and agencies involved in PD; a lack of PD strategies and programs; and insuffi cient resources. Th e report defi ned "Arab propaganda" as a "strategic threat" and recommended an eff ective PD program with a clear and well-defi ned strategy, adequate administrative structure and resources, and most importantly, a "supreme head" that would manage and coordinate the national PD system.
In response to this critical report, the Cabinet in December 2003 established a committee to recommend measures for a major reform in Israel's PD,with Prime Minister Sharon appointing his Cabinet Secretary Yisrael Maimon as chair. Th e Committee was instructed to submit a report in 30 days, but the work lasted more than three-and-ahalf years. An interim report was submitted in April 2006 for discussion and approval by the Cabinet, but the sudden eruption of the Second Lebanon war delayed the discussion. Moreover, the war was the occasion for a major Israeli PD failure, 34 and another committee of inquiry, the Vinograd Committee, established by the Cabinet to investigate the conduct and consequences of the war, criticized Israel's PD and made several recommendations for remedies. 35 Consequently, the Maimon Committee now had to consider the State Comptroller's report, the PD conducted during the war, and the recommendations of the Vinograd Committee.
Th e Maimon Committee eventually recommended establishing one central authority to guide and coordinate all the PD eff orts under the leadership of a professional high ranking offi cial. Th e offi cial would be appointed by the Prime Minister, would report to him, would participate in Cabinet critical meetings on national security and foreign policy, and would have authority to guide ministers and senior offi cials.
36 On 8 July 2008, however, the Cabinet adopted only a diluted version of Maimon's proposal. It established a new national PD coordination unit at the Prime Minister's Offi ce, but it downgraded the standing and that of its head. Th e unit would only "coordinate" and not "guide and coordinate". Th e head would be the Prime Minister's communication advisor who, given pressing national and political matters related to the Prime Minister, would have little time for PD.
Th is work builds on suggestions made by the State Comptroller and the Miamon Committee but off ers a much more elaborate centralized PD model, built around a new authority at the Prime Minister's Offi ce. Th is central authority would function over the next fi ve to ten years, until PD is adequately immersed in the foreign policy and defense establishment; selection of the authority's head, the administrative structure and resources would meet the agency's principal functions of eff ective government-wide guidance and coordination. If possible and desirable, the authority may also coordinate PD activities among extragovernmental organizations. Figure 3 describes the structure and components of a new PD system built around this authority. It consists of a head, public advisory council, several functional departments, an information and communication centre, and desks for short-term and long-term PD instruments.
It is possible to appoint a minister or a deputy minister at the Prime Minister's Offi ce to lead the authority, but a professional director is preferable, as politicians are likely to inject political or personal interests into the working of the authority and are likely to battle with other ministers, especially those responsible for defense and foreign aff airs. To increase the prestige and authority of the head, the holder of this position would be appointed by the PM and directly report to him. In addition, the head would receive the rank of Director General, the highest rank in the civil service, and would regularly participate in cabinet meetings on defense and foreign aff airs.
Th e Public Advisory Council should include prominent representatives from various sectors including businessmen, industrialists, authors, artists, musicians, scholars, publishers, journalists, and retired diplomats and military offi cers. It would meet at least once a year and provide both advice and networking. Council members would be appointed by the Prime Minister and approved by the Cabinet. Th e proposed PD authority would have several functional departments, especially for research and development, doctrine, training, and evaluation. Th e research and development department would prepare the infrastructure and data needed to formulate PD strategies. It would also conduct thorough evaluation of activities and programs. Th e training department would train both the authority staff and officials working on PD both in the governmental and the extra-governmental sectors.
Th e communication and information centre would serve as the heart of the authority, guiding and coordinating existing and future activities. Th e centre would gather and process relevant information from various sources, including the media and all the governmental and extra-governmental organizations, and would initiate and employ eff ective listening methods. Based on information received from sources, the center would produce guidelines for all bodies working on specifi c short-term and long-term PD instruments, submitted them fi rst to the head for approval, transmission, and coordination.
Working with relevant representatives of the PMO, the MFA, MOD, MITL, and Police, the authority would handle both short-term and long-term PD and would recommend appropriate instruments for specifi c situations and audiences. Several instruments such as media relations, public relations, cyber PD, international broadcasting, law fare, and extra-governmental PD are more suitable for short-term reactive and pro-active PD. 37 Others, such as cultural diplomacy, international exchanges, corporate or business diplomacy, branding, and foreign aid are more suitable for long-term PD.
Conclusions
Adjusting PD to the challenges of the information age and the rapid changes in international relations may be divided into three categories based on whether the required adjustments are minor or major and whether they deal with issues or fundamental structures. Th e three categories are revising, reforming and rebuilding. Revising refers to situations where the PD system works eff ectively and needs only minor adjustments in areas such as personnel, budgets and programs. Reforming refers to situations where parts of the system do not work properly or are outdated and more far-reaching structural changes are needed. Reforms may include creating new positions or offi ces, abolishing or moving offi ces. or altering hierarchies. Rebuilding may also include these activities, but it refers to systems that do not work and need substantial structural overhaul. Based on our typology, Israel's PD needs rebuilding.
Despite overwhelming security threats from immediate neighbors and more distant enemies, and despite the increasing importance of soft power and PD, Israel has not been able yet to overhaul its PD system. Th e country adopted the closed approach to reform, similar to the one used by states such as Norway and Poland, but so far the eff ort has been very limited and produced very little results. Many governmental and extra-governmental units and organizations are active in PD. Th eir contributions, however, are hampered by a lack of direction and coordination. As a result, the inadequate and highly fragmented system oft en fails to meet the challenges of modern PD and the low intensity confl ict with the Palestinians and Hezbollah.
Th e main problem in the system is structural, and therefore the existing highly fragmented and ineff ective model should be replaced by a centralized model based on a new PD authority which should be established at the Prime Minister's Offi ce. Th e mere establishmen of the agency, however, would not be suffi cient. In making critical decisions on national security and on war and peace, Israel must consider PD eff ects and ramifi cations. Th e proposed authority head should be present in cabinet meetings and add PD to the deliberation of options. Israel must also develop a coherent PD strategy and systematically apply it to organizations, instruments and evolving crises situations. Th e proposed authority should help to develop this strategy in cooperation with the Public Advisory Council and the relevant ministries and organizations inside and outside the government.
Th e authority should conduct an annual PD conference with all the relevant governmental and extra-governmental actors from Israel and abroad, to evaluate and discuss existing programs and activities and to consider new ones. Th e authority may initiate a dialogue with the Israeli public on PD, similar to that held in Canada and Australia.
Th e government has to substantially increase funding for PD and create a better balance between hard and soft power in Israel's foreign policy. A successful and functional PD system also requires constant monitoring and evaluations of programs and activities.
Diff erent state and non-state actors have diff erent PD needs, and they oft en have to adjust their strategies and programs to rapidly changing trends and circumstances. While we have focused on Israel, the approach suggested here may assist with the design and implementation of reforms in PD systems, primarily in cases of small states or middle powers facing serious international challenges.
